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When government expenditures exceed current taxrevenues, the
resulting deficit must be financed either by issuing bonds, which
imply obligations to levy future taxes, or by creating
high—powered money. The choice between money and bonds is often
thought to be of great moment for both real and nominal variables;
that is, monetary policy matters.
There is by now a wide empirical consensus that monetary
policy has effects on real variables like output and employment.
<1> But there is far less agreement about why this is so. The
purpose of this paper is to take issue with some currently
fashionable views of why money has real effects, and to suggest a
new theory, or rather resurrect an old one ——theloanable funds
theory ——andgive it new, improved microfoundations. <2>
I •SOMENEW IRRELEVANCE THEOREMS
-
Inclassical monetary theory prices are fully flexible and
the future tax liabilities implied by government bonds are fully
discounted.In such a world, government spending has identical
effects whether it is financed by bonds (thus creating a
"deficit") or by current taxation, and an open—market purchase of
bonds is equivalent to a money rain. Consequently, a swap of
future for current taxes has neither real nor nominal effects, and
a swap of money for bonds affects only the price level. <3>
But these irrelevance theorems rest on microfoundations that
are not well specified. For example, classical monetary theoryPAGE 2
presumably applies to a frictionless world of certainty, and
mostly ignores the dynamic effects on real rates of return that
arise when monetary policy changes the path of the inflation
rate.
If an explicity dynamic, general equilibrium model in which
people form (rational) expectations about the uncertain future is
constructed, a number of irrelevance theorems about government
financial policy can be established, provided that financial
changes do not redistribute the tax burden. <4> For example, let
the government reduce current taxes, issue bonds, and sometime
later raise taxes to retire the bonds. Not only will such a
policy leave real consumption and investment by all individuals in
all states of nature unchanged, but neither will it change any
prices. The reason is Say's Law of Government Deficits. the
increase in the supply of government debt gives rise to an
identical increase in the demand.
Other irrelevance propositions can be established. For
example, if the government changes the maturity structure of its
debt, or exchanges indexed for non—indexed bonds, such changes
will be irrelevant because of exactly offsetting changes in the
demands for different government securities. <5> Similarly, a
change in the rate of inflation that is matched by a change in the
nominal interest paid on government debt does not disturb
equilibrium in any market.
Some of these irrelevance results are familiar. Others
contrast sharply with the implications of traditional portfolioPAGE 3
theory. For example, a standard argument holds that a change in
the maturity structure of the government debt will requ.ire a
change in the term structure of interest rates to equilibrate the
demands and supplies of different types of bonds. But this
argument ignores the tacit, and exactly offsetting, changes in
liabilities implied by the structure of taxes across time and
states of nature. Perhaps individuals also ignore the implied tax
changes. But to use this as a major theoretical underpinning of
the effectiveness of monetary policy is to ground the theory in
irrationality, an anathema to economists of the Modern School.
I I •THEIRRELEVANCE OF IRRELEVANCE THEOREMS
As suggested at the outset, the empirical evidence is not
favorable to these irrelevance theorems. They imply, for example,
that neither swaps between current and future taxes (non—monetized
budget deficits) nor open—market operations (creation of
high—powered money) matter.
To test these notions, three critical U.S. time series were
regressed on their own lagged values, lagged values of changes in
bank reserves, and lagged values of changes in government debt.
Specifically, the regressions took the formi
AX/X =a(L)(AX/X)+b(L)(AR/R)+c(L)(AD/D)+
whereA is the first—difference operator; a(L), b(L), and c(L) are
polynomials in the lag operator; R is bank reserves; D is the
government debt; and X is alternatively nominal GNP (V), real GNPPAGE 4
Cy), or the GNP deflator (P). <6> Regressions were run with the
maximum lag set alternatively at two or three years.
If open—market operations were irrelevant, then all the b's
would be zero. In the case of nominal GNP, this hypothesis is
easily rejected with F values of 6.9 and 9.2. (See Table 1.) But
for real GNP and prices, the evidence is mixed. In each case, one
regression rejects the irrelevance proposition while the other
does not.
If swaps between current and future taxes (holding reserve
creation constant) were irrelevant, then all the c's would be
zero. The regressions for nominal GNP overwhelmingly reject this
hypothesis (with F values of 10.5 and 14.6). And the regressions
for inflation also reject it, though less decisively. However, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that non— monetized deficits are
irrelevant for real GNP growth.
On balance,.the evidence is not very favorable to the
irrelevance theorems in their strong forms. <7> This dissonance
between the theorems and the apparent facts suggests a need to
examine the assumptions that underlie the irrelevance theorems.
Full rationality has already been mentioned. Equally obvious is
the assumption that all taxes are lumpsum; no one ever claimed
that swaps among distorting taxes would be neutral.
The theorems also assume that taxes are distributionally
neutral. It is well known that changes in the distribution of
income and wealth across individuals can have real effects. <8>
Analogously, redistributing the tax burden across generations canPAGE 5
have real effects if indiviuals have no heirs or fail to
incorporate fully their heirs' welfare into their own utility
functions. While the presence of these effects seems
incontrovertible,, one wonders about their empirical importance.
is redistribution across generations really the driving force
behind monetary policy?
The irrelevance theorems also ignore the difference between
interest—bearing government debt and non— interest— bearing money,
which is held for transactions purposes. Traditional monetary
theory has focused on this difference. <9> Surely paper money and
checking balances have advantages in transactions over other
potential media of exchange. But are these advantages
sufficiently large to explain the effectiveness of monetary policy
by arguing, e.g., that a contrived scarcity of the medium of
exchange will constrain economic activity? In Italy, when there
was a shortage of small change, candy became a medium of exchange.
And now, with computerized banking, it should be relatively easy
for velocity to change quickly to compensate for any shortage of
money. Recent innovations like CMA's suggest that the
transactions costs of providing a medium of exchange paying a
market rate of interest cannot be very large. We believe that
only regulation and lack of full rationality <10> prevented
checking accounts from paying market interest rates for so long.
Another assumption pertains to the informational content of
monetary or debt policy: the irrelevance theorems assume that
policy actions do not change peoples' beliefs about the differentPAGEÔ
states of nature. But if the government has superior information
(which it does not make public), and uses this information in
formulating policy, then policy might have real effects because of
the information it conveys to the private sector. In addition, if
monetary policy has a random element, individuals will have
trouble distinguishing between price movements that are the
consequence of real shocks and those that are the consequence of
monetary shocks, as in Robert Lucas (1973). This, too, can give
money the power to influence real variables.
But can these informational issues be empirically important?
We are skeptical. In addition to the weekly money supply number,
a firm can look at its inventories, sales data, the national
unemployment rate, and many other facts and figures that help it
distinguish between real and nominal shocks. Besides, at low and
moderate rates of inflation, people always know the current price
level within a very small margin of error, and therefore can
easily convert any absolute price into a relative one with great
accuracy. It therefore seems implausible that the issues
emphasized by the new classical macroeconomics can explain the
apparently powerful effects of monetary policy on output.
A final, and very critical, assumption that underlies the
irrelevance theorems is that capital markets are perfect. But
people cannot borrow freely at the government's interest rate, and
for a very good reason: they might default. The probability of
default, and the informational imperfections that it implies, lie
at the heart of our alternative theory of how monetary policyPAGE 7
works.
III. IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND CREDIT RATIONING
Imperfect information about the probability of default has
several fundamental implications for the nature of capital
markets.
First, it gives rise to institutions ——likebanks ——that
specialize in acquiring information about default risk. Such
information is valuable. A lender with superior information can
more easily distinguish between good and bad risks, thereby
raising hisown net (of default losses) rate of return. But such
information is very specific (knowing that Company A is a good
risk may tell us little about Company B) and, for a variety of
reasons, is also difficult to transfer.
Second, banks will seek ways to screen out untrustworthy
borrowers. For example, banks know that a higher loan rate will
attract an applicant pool with fewer good borrowers (who are
dissuaded by the high rate) and more bad ones (who are not
dissuaded because they are likely to default). So, rather than
post a market—clearing rate and accept all comers, they will post
a lower rate that attracts "excess demand" and extend credit only
to those they deem to be good risks. Thus credit rationing arises
as an equilibrium phenomenon. <11> This observation plays a
crucial role in the theory we develop here.
Third, banks will try to devise contracts that provide strongFAGE 8
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Tight money thus brings on a recession. Note also that, because
of credit rationing, all this may happen with little increase in
interest rates. <12> So the effectiveness of monetary policy in
this model does not rely on large interest elasticities, which
often cannot be found empirically.
Two important questions remain. First, what stops prices
from falling so fast that neither the real supply of credit nor
real output has to decline, thereby robbing monetary policy of its
real effects? Second, why do borrowers that are denied credit by
the banks not turn elsewhere, e.g., to the auction market?
The first question is as old as monetary theory itself, and
bedevils any attempt to provide a deep explanation of the real
effects of monetary policy. Part of the answer is simple and
quite generali expected price changes affect the expected returns
on holding financial assets (such as money), and therefore have
real effects. <13> But we have Just expressed doubts about the
empirical importance of interest elasticities of this sort. The
rest of the answer has to do with the fact ——theunexplained fact
——thatmany long—term contracts without complete indexation
exist. We do not have a good explanation f or this phenomenon.
<14> Neither does anyone else. But that does not imply that its
consequences should be ignored.
The other question is more specific to our approach. Recall
that we rejected the transactions mechanism as an explanation f or
the real effects of money on the grounds that there were toomany
close substitutes. Analogously, our theory would not hold up ifPAGE 10
close substitutes for bank credit were readily available. Are
there close substitutes?
If there were perfect (or very cheap) information, then a
reduction in bank credit would be offset by an increase in nonbank
credit. Central bank policy would change the locus of borrowing,
but would change neither the total volume of credit nor who gets
it. However, we have argued that costly and specialized
information is the essence of the credit market, so that good
substitutes for bank credit do not exist.
What about the market for commercial paper, for example? For
some large firms (like General Motor!) this is a real option, and
they use it. In this sector of the economy, curtailments of bank
credit may be offset by expansions of open market credit. But the
fact of the matter is that for many firms, including all the small
ones, commercial paper is simply not an option; if the banks are
forced to contract, they end up credit constrained. Thus, like
Stiglitz and Weiss (1991), we view the credit market as divided
into clienteles. Very low risk borrowers can use the open market,
and are never credit constrained. Very high risk borrowers cannot
get credit at all ——atany price. Those in between may be
rationed, and this rationing becomes more severe when the central
bank drains reserves from the banking system.
Notice that the segmentation of credit markets should become
particularly severe during recessions, when even large, well known
firms, face the possibility of default. Since investors assume
that banks have superior knowledge about their customers, a firmPAGE 11
that comes to the open market because it was rationed by its bank
will be viewed as a bad risk, and therefore charged a higher
interest rate.
Not much has been said so far about money; the emphasis has
been on credit. To relate the two, consider the balance sheet of
a typical bank:
Assets Liabilities
Reserves CR) Deposits CD)
Loans CL)
Government Bonds CB) Net Worth
Under a system of fractional reserve banking in which lending
institutions also provide the medium of exchange Cdeposits) <15>,
L and D will be closely related. Take our previous example in
which the central bank makes an open—market sale of government
bands. B rises and R falls by an equal amount. Banks then find
themselves short on reserves and, as mentioned above, must
contract L. But if R and D are held in fixed proportion, then the
decline in deposits ——andtherefore in the money supply ——must
match the decline in loans.
Thus, while we have two competing theories ——onebased on
credit, the other on money ——thatare conceptually distinct, the
data will have a very hard time distinguishing between them
empirically because credit and money normally are highly
collinear. <16> Given an institutional structure in which thePAGE 12
same institutions supply loans and the medium of exchange,
devising tests to distinguish between the "credit" theory and the
"money" theory is no easy matter. And we do not pretend to have
done this. However, we can make some suggestive remarks.
First, a series of papers by Benjamin Friedman (1981, 1982)
has documented the facts that (a) a broad measure of credit (far
broader than bank credit) does just as well as money in
forecasting future movements in nominal GNP, and (b) credit is
just about as closely related to the Fed's instrument as is any of
the monetary aggregates.
Second, Ben Bernanke's (1982) study of detailed data from the
Great Depression suggests that the decline in money was too small
to account for the sharp drop in output, but that a proxy for
credit stringency does rather well.
Third, the particular factors that have led to the breakdown
of the demand function for money in recent years ——deregulation
and financial innovation ——oughtnot to have destroyed the demand
function for credit, according to the arguments presented here.
In a period of rapid financial innovation, the ability of the
central bank to curtail economic activity by causing a scarcity of
the medium of exchange should be severely limited. Yet the Fed
seems to have caused a severe disruption of economic activity, and
has even done so without reducing the growth rate of money very
much. <17> We suggest that restrictions on the availability of
credit, via the mechanisms discussed here, may provide a better
explanation of how the Fed killed the economy. <18>FGE :13
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FOOTNOTES
1. For some recent evidence, see Frederic Mishkin (1982) or Robert
Gordon (1982).
2. Recently, Meir Kohn (1981, 1982) has also attempted to
resurrect the loanable funds theory, though on rather different
grounds. Ben Bernanke (1982) develops arguments similar to those
presented here. Lindbeck (1962) is a particularly clear
intellectual antecedent to the arguments presented here.
3. See Don Patinkin (1965), where these and other aspects of
classical monetary theory are spelled out.
4. The proofs can be found in Joseph Stiglitz (1981, 1982).
5. The proofs of these propositions parallel corresponding results
in corporate finance. If prices are unchanged, then it can be
shown that individual opportunity sets are unchanged. But
identical opportunity sets lead to identical consumption and
investment decisions.
6. Time was easured in fiscal years, so as to get a more accurate
measure of the budget deficit, and the sample period covered
1952—1981. R is adJusted bank reserves, as calculated by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.D is the increase inPAGE 15
government indebtedness to the public during the fiscal years
7. For more detailed results, see Alan Blinder (1982).
8. See, for example, Patinkin (1965).
9. See, for example, James Tobin (1962, 1969).
10. How else can one explain the fact that individuals still hold
over $300 billion in passbook savings accounts?
11. The argument is developed by Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss
(1981).
12. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that a tightening of creditmay
not imply a rise in the rate of interest.
13. Real effects can be avoided only by an exactly offsetting
change in the nominal interest rate on financial assets. The
analogy between the short—run rigidities imposed by multi— period
nominal wage contracts and those imposed by multi— period nominal
loan contracts should be apparent.
14. For one attempt to explain why wages and interest ratesmay
not be fully indexed, see Blinder (1977). Joanna Gray (1976)
offers an alternative explanation for wage contracts.PAGE 16
1. A deep question is why the same institutions that provide
loans also provide transactions services. It may have to do with
the information banks automatically acquire in the process of
handling their customers' payments.
16. King and Plosser (1982) offer yet another model with similar
empirical implications but quite different theoretical origins.
17. The growth rates of what we currently call Ml (on a
December—to—December basis) were 8.3% during 1978, 7.1% during
1979, 6.6% during 1980, 6.4% during 1981, and 8.5% during 1982.
These numbers hardly suggest a savage monetary squeeze.
18. During the same five periods mentioned in the preceding
footnote, the growth rates of commercial bank loans were 18.1%,
13.8%, 7.8%, 6.4% and 7.0%. The decline here is far more
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